HISTORY
Professor Robert S. Hartman, Philosopher
(1910 - 1973)
Hartman Value Profile-Pomeroy Interpretation-Validation
Professor R. S. Hartman Discovered a Mathematical Model of Value and Moral Phenomena Subsequently Empirically Validated by studies summarized in the pages of "The New Science of Axiological Psychology."
(C) Dr. Leon Pomeroy All Rights Reserved
Copyright © 2000-2008 Behavioral Axiology™ Last Updated: 05/31/09
KNOWING
PATIENTS THROUGH THEIR VALUES By
Professor Rem B. Edwards Emeritus Professor, University of Tennessee at Knoxville
Abstract The
best way to learn about your patients is to get to know their
values, for values are the essential keys to personality structures.
Without being fully aware of it, psychotherapists deal with the
intrinsic, extrinsic, and systemic values of their patients all of
the time. The basic concepts of psychotherapy, e.g., those relating
to therapeutic goals and means to ends, are value-laden concepts.
Therapists need to know both what patients value and how they value.
The Hartman Value Profile is an effective instrument for knowing
such things. It tells us directly about the structure of a
person’s values and indirectly about the structure of a person’s
personality. It has been extensively validated using the very best
validation methodologies. 2.
To understand better the distinction between intrinsic, extrinsic,
and systemic values (what is valued) and valuations (how something
is valued) and how each of these has a place in psychotherapy. 3.
To understand better that and how the personalities and behaviors of
patients are structured around what and how they value 4.
To learn about the Hartman Value Profile (HVP) as a powerful tool
for measuring the value structure of patients’ personalities, how
their values are linked to the character traits and behaviors of
concern to psychotherapists, and the usefulness of the HVP in
diagnosis, therapy, and measuring therapeutic progress. 1.
Intrinsic values are
a. means to ends,
b. ends in themselves,
c. elements of a system,
d. all of the above. 2.
Values are present in
a. therapeutic goals,
b. therapeutic techniques,
c. therapeutic theories,
d. all of the above. 3.
Valuations are
a. what we value,
b. who we value,
c. how we value,
d. all of the above. 4.
The “Hierarchy of Value” affirms that
a. people are more valuable than things,
b. ideas and beliefs are more valuable than people,
c. things are more valuable than ideas of things,
d. people are less valuable than things. 5.
The first part of the Hartman Value Profile asks people to rank 18
items
a. from most pleasant to least pleasant,
b. from most self-centered to least self-centered,
c. from best to worst,
d. from least pro-social to most pro-social. 6.
Applied internationally or cross-culturally, the Hartman Value
Profile
a. proves that some values are absolute and some are
relative,
b. proves value absolutism,
c. proves value relativity,
d. proves nothing relevant to the absolutism/relativism
controversy. KNOWING
PATIENTS THROUGH THEIR VALUES
Therapists get to know their patients most commonly through
clinical interviews, discussions during therapy, observing their
physical behaviors, analyzing their verbal behaviors, noting responses
to particular psychotropic medications, applying and interpreting
personality tests or profiles, reviewing records, and listening to
what other people say about them. No one approach is sufficient unto
itself, and each makes an important contribution.
This discussion is about getting to know patients by getting to
know their values. In doing this, therapists may also learn a great
deal about their own values. Strangely, psychotherapists seldom if ever
ask their patients, “What are your deepest values?,” “Do your
values structure your personality or psychological constitution,”
and “If so, how so?[A1]”
Indeed, most patients would not know how to answer if asked, and most
therapists would not know how to ask! A direct approach is likely to
be fruitless, yet therapists deal with patient values all the time,
the values of patients do structure their inner personalities and
external responses, and a powerful tool is available for discovering
that and how this is so. Because therapists talk a different partly
technical language and are not always fully aware that values are
embedded within that language, they may not be fully cognizant of
constantly dealing with human values. All
of this requires some explaining, so let’s begin with values. All of
us, including therapists, have norms or standards by which we measure
successes and failures. Therapists apply norms or standards to
themselves and to their patients in determining their own professional
successes and failures. “Help,” “therapy,” “cure,”
“health,” “adaptation,” “maturation,” “relief,”
“growth,” “normal,” “pro-social,” “realistic,”
“respect,” “self-respect,” “acceptance,” “ego ideal,”
“goals,” “objectives,” “well-being,” “patient
interests,” “rational autonomy,” “sanity,” “risk,”
“disorder,” their opposites, and almost every other professional
word in vocabularies of psychotherapists are value-laden words or
concepts. Values are an integral part of their very meaning; they all
involve measuring their intentional objects by norms or standards.
According to highly plausible philosophical definitions, “value
objects” are just the entities to which we apply norms or
standards, “valuation” is the activity that involves
measuring things by appropriate norms or standards, and “valuable
or good things” are those that “measure up” or “fulfill
their norms or standards” (Hartman, 1967). All psychotherapeutic
processes and activities have goals or objectives (value objects),
norms or standards are applied (valuation, which may hereafter be
called “evaluation”) in determining whether and the degree to
which these objectives are met, and a good or successful therapeutic
strategy is one that achieves therapy’s objectives by bringing about
value objects like self-esteem, realistic self-knowledge, pro-social
behaviors, personal growth and maturation, rational autonomy,
self-control, responsibility, and freedom from disturbing and
debilitating problems in living.
If human personalities are structured around values, then
knowing these values is the essential key to understanding human
personalities, whether “normal” or “abnormal.” This claim
might seem unpromising at first to therapists because they
assume that we have no way to measure and rationally order human
values or to link personality traits and behaviors to them. Shortly I
will introduce a powerful, efficient, and effective way to do such
things. It will be obvious hereafter that my thinking has been deeply
influenced by a former philosophical colleague, Robert S. Hartman, now
deceased. Not
all human values and evaluations are exactly alike or on a par.
Philosophers and others have traditionally recognized at least two
basic kinds of value objects—intrinsic values and extrinsic values;
and Robert S. Hartman recognized and identified a neglected (but still
pervasive) third kind of value object—systemic values. Hartman also
identified normal or normative human responses to or evaluations of
these value objects.
Hartman made an important and illuminating distinction between what
we value—values or value objects, and how we value—valuations.
We should try to be as clear as possible about the differences between
values (what we value) and evaluations (how we value), and we can
profit from what Hartman had to say about such things. If
we ask, “What things are good?,” we must recognize at least three
basic kinds or dimensions of goodness or value. As identified by
Hartman, the three elemental kinds of valuable things are: (1)
Systemic Values, (S): conceptual constructs that exist in our
minds. Examples:
definitions, ideas, concepts, ideals, norms, standards, rules,
beliefs, truths, doctrines, musical notations, mathematical and
logical systems, and the like. (2)
Extrinsic Values, (E): tangible things, processes, actions, or
roles located and observable in our common world of space and time
that are actual or potential means to ends. Examples:
physical objects and processes, bodies, books, houses, cars, human
actions and behaviors, and
social relations, roles, conventions, and groups, and established
institutions. (3)
Intrinsic Values, (I): things that have value in, of, and for
themselves; things that should be evaluated intrinsically because they
are ends in themselves, desirable or valuable for their own sakes. Examples:
unique centers of conscious experience, choice, thought, and valuation
such as human persons, non-human animals, and God—according to
Hartman. Other philosophers suggest that the pleasures of human
intercourse, the enjoyment of beautiful objects,
knowledge and/or its pursuit, pleasure or happiness as such,
freedom, dutifulness, desire fulfillment, etc., are intrinsically
good; but such things exist only within the lives of those unique
conscious individuals (like us) who exist for themselves. They
are good-making properties that enrich the lives of unique conscious
individuals. From
the very beginning, people have attached value to things in many
different ways. All evaluations include cognitive or mental elements,
i.e., value standards or concepts by which objects of value are
measured. Evaluations involve judgments by persons about objects of
value, judgments that valued objects measure up to standards, or that
they fail to do so to some degree. The good ones measure up; the fair,
average, poor, and bad ones do not, or they do so only by degrees.
Evaluation also includes feelings, affections, emotions, and desires
that range on a continuum from minimal (systemic), through ordinary
(extrinsic), to maximal (intrinsic) personal involvement.
Examples: “2 + 2 =
4”
“This session will end at 10:35 a.m.”
“If you are not for me, you are against me.”
“Race is all that counts.” (2)
Extrinsic Valuations, (S): commonplace feelings, role
involvements, practical motives, activities, and judgments. Examples:
ordinary everyday practical feelings, likes and dislikes, emotions,
appetites, needs, and interests, practical actions and vocations,
fulfilling social-role expectations, practical value judgments,
classifications, and comparisons. (3)
Intrinsic Valuations, (I): complete self-identification with
valued objects; intense personal involvement with, concentration upon,
or investment in value objects; judgments of identification,
totality, and uniqueness. This kind of evaluation includes all
the ways in which conscious individuals like us combine or unite
ourselves totally, intensely, and passionately, (either positively or
negatively), with objects of evaluation, so that distinctions between
self and valued-other cease to matter or to be noticed, and “the
subject/object distinction” is overcome or overwhelmed
psychologically and valuationally. Examples:
profound love and empathy, intense delight and joy, conscience,
creativity, deep religious devotion, worship, communion, and mystical
union.
Without going into it here in detail, negative systemic,
extrinsic, and intrinsic disvalues and disvaluations, the opposites of
the preceding positive values and valuations must also be recognized.
Also, anything can be evaluated in any dimension, as when some people
relate only with detachment to other people, or treat other people as
mere things, or relate with total intrinsic devotion and
self-identification to material possessions or to ideological dogmas. “Better
than”and the Hierarchy of Values and Valuations Hartman
offered a formal definition of “better” to complement his formal
definition of “good.” He wrote that “‘Richer in qualities’
is the definition of ‘better,’ ‘poorer in qualities’ is the
definition of ‘worse’” (Hartman, 1967, p. 114). For clarity, I
find it helpful to add “good-making” to this definition,
especially since so many philosophers use this terminology. Let’s
define “better than” as “having more good-making properties
than.” Given that definition, we can then ask if any of the above
three dimensions of value and evaluation are better than any of the
others. The answer is definitely affirmative.
Hartman’s “Hierarchy of Value” affirms that intrinsic
values are better than extrinsic values, and extrinsic values are
better than systemic values.
Given this formal definition of “better than,” intrinsic
values have more good-making properties than extrinsic values, and
extrinsic values have more good-making properties than systemic
values. In application, this means that people have more
good-making properties than mere things, and real things and people
have more good-making properties than mere ideas of things or of
people. Our value priorities should thus put people first, things
second, and ideas of or about people
and things third. Many if not most serious human moral problem arise
from assuming that people are less valuable than things or beliefs, or
from valuing only a few people intrinsically but not everyone. Systemic,
Extrinsic, and Intrinsic Values and Valuations in Psychotherapy The
principal concerns and goals of psychotherapy all fall under the
rubric of one or more of these three kinds of value and evaluation.
Each of the many “schools” of psychotherapy may stress its own
distinctive values and evaluations, but they tend to hold many general
goals in common. They differ mainly in their explanations of the
causes of psychiatric problems and, most importantly for present
purposes, in the therapeutic strategies they employ to reach their
goals, but not in the goals themselves. Some examples might help.
“Cognitive scripts” that people run through their minds are
systemic values, and helping patients to run realistic and
pro-social scripts through their minds is a significant systemic
therapeutic value, goal, or objective of most psychotherapy.
External or bodily behaviors directed toward themselves,
others, things, institutions, ideologies, etc., are extrinsic values.
They are means to ends beyond themselves. Are your patients well
behaved, or misbehaved? Do they “act out” in ways that injure,
degrade, or destroy themselves, other people, property, the
environment, or universal human ideals? If so, for what troublesome
ends or goals? Are their extrinsic values pro- or anti-self,
anti-social, anti-material, anti-environmental, anti-ideological, or
what? Are the means they employ to achieve their ends effective or
ineffective? Do they value other people so little, or disvalue them so
much, that they are excessively aggressive or downright violent
batterers or abusers? If your patients are the victims of others with
such anti-person values, how do you help them to live in a world that
has such people in it? What values or disvalues motivate abusers and
victims? What more “constructive” values are you trying to get
them to adopt? To what extent is your therapy concerned with the
extrinsic values and disvalues of your patients, e.g., with means to
their sometimes questionable or hopefully more desirable ends, or with
their fixation on things and social status? Are your patients
excessively involved with the pursuit of high social status, i.e.,
with overvalued “superiority,” and, if so, at what costs to
themselves and other people? What ends do prosperity, possessions, and
high status serve, or do your patients regard them as ends in
themselves? Or are your patients too little concerned with their own
social connections? Do they attach too little value to their own place
in society, thus being prone to social apathy, withdrawal, and
isolation? What counts as a “realistic” concern with prosperity,
possessions, and social standing?
Many therapeutic modalities, as means to
therapeutic goals or objectives, are available to
today’s psychotherapists. To your competent patients (or
their proxies if not competent) do you explain both alternative goals
or ends and alternative means to them, in the interest of obtaining
their informed voluntary consent? Obtaining informed voluntary consent
is a very concrete and practical way to treat patients as ends in
themselves and not as mere means to someone else’s ends.[A3]
Do you try to help your patients value themselves and other
people in the very best way possible? If so, is that the systemic way
of detachment or dissociation, or the extrinsic way of “normal”
everyday involvement and caution, or the intrinsic way of empathy,
love, intense personal identification, and caregiving? [A4]Or
is it all of the above in harmony or balance in their proper place?
Patients who attach too little intrinsic worth to themselves have too
little self-esteem and suffer all of the consequent social and
personal liabilities. Do extremely anti-social, alienated, withdrawn,
and negligently-social patients attach too little intrinsic worth to
other people? What value correctives do you envision for and offer to
such patients? To what standards or norms of correct or proper
pro-social behavior do you or should you appeal in answering such
questions? How do you measure such things?
Are some of your patients predominately oriented extrinsically?
Are they almost completely absorbed in the material or sensory world
and/or in the pursuit of social power, control, or dominance? Are they
too thoroughly “worldly,” as the theologians might say, or too
“commonsensical” and “down to earth,” as they might view
themselves, in their values? Are they so focused on instrumental
“practical” values that they have little understanding of or
appreciation for intellectual systemic and personal intrinsic values?
Are they comparatively insensitive to the value of thoughts and ideas,
and/or to the value of people as unique centers of conscious
experience, activity, and value? If so, what should you do to help
them? What goals for them should the “helping professions”
promote? If your patients overvalue or undervalue observable things
and behaviors in ways that create serious problems in living for them,
what would it be like for them to properly value things and activities
that make life worthwhile? What would it be like to get it just right,
to neither overvalue nor undervalue the extrinsic? To what hierarchy
of values and valuations do you appeal in answering such questions?
What should the priorities of your patients be? What should your own
value priorities be?
Comparatively speaking, are some of your patients excessively
intrinsic, dwelling too much, too sentimentally, romantically, or
narcissistically on intrinsic values (e.g., “my beloved,” or “my
absolute uniqueness”), while they neglect their systemic cognitive
and extrinsic practical capacities, or while they intrinsically
evaluate only themselves? Are they intrinsic “love slobs,”
desperate to be loved, but unable or unwilling to give it? Or do they
undervalue the intrinsic altogether and consistently fail or refuse to
respect either themselves or other people as ends in themselves? Are
they so extremely antisocial and psychopathic that they do not even
need the approval of others and are devoid of intrinsic valuational
capacities like empathy, conscience, and remorse? Do they fail to love
others as themselves because they do not love themselves? Do they
devalue others because they devalue themselves? What global
value-restructuring of their personalities do you envision and
prescribe for intrinsic over- or under- valuers? In helping your
patients to re-create themselves, what values and evaluations should
have priority over others. To what hierarchy of value priorities do
you appeal? [A5]Introducing the Hartman
Value Profile What,
if any, psychological instruments are available to help
psychotherapists deal with the preceding value-laden issues? You may
have an answer already, but I would like to introduce you to an easy
and quick-to-use personality profile that
I believe to be more powerful and effective than any and all others[A6],
(even though learning to score and interpret it correctly is not easy
and quick). It is not a “psychological” profile at all in any
traditional sense of the term; rather it is a value profile, an
“axiological” profile, that gets at people’s personalities by
getting at their values and how they rank or order them. If values are
the real keys to human personalities, as Robert S. Hartman believed,
his profile, the Hartman Value Profile, goes right to the heart of the
matter. If administered at the outset, it can answer many of your
troublesome value questions about patients before your very first
extended interview with them. Many readers may be acquainted already
with the Hartman Value Profile (HVP), but I will try to introduce it
to those who are not. Of necessity, this introduction must be only a
short beginning, not the whole story.
Robert S. Hartman realized that systemic, extrinsic, and
intrinsic values and valuations can be combined with one another in
many different ways, that some of these combinations enhance or
increase value (e.g., milk chocolate and nuts), and that other
combinations decrease, degrade, or destroy value (e.g., milk chocolate
and motor oil). The HVP consists of two parts; each contains eighteen
value-combination items; nine are positive and nine are negative.
(Three basic entities or types of value can be combined with one
another in eighteen logically possible ways.) In each value
combination item, one value or evaluation is dominant in the sense
that its combination with the other value either enhances or
diminishes overall value.
Those taking the profile are asked to rank eighteen items from
best to worst by assigning the numbers “1” through “18” to
each item on each part of the profile. In the nine positive,
desirable, or good items, three intrinsic values are dominant, three
extrinsic values are dominant, and three systemic values are dominant;
the same logical distribution exists for the nine negative, disvalue,
undesirable, or bad items.
An ideally correct ranking based on the aforementioned
threefold hierarchy of value is presupposed. Ideally, given the
hierarchy of value, the three intrinsic-dominant positive items should
be ranked “1,” “2,” and “3;” the three extrinsic-dominant
items should be ranked “4,” “5,” and “6,” and the three
systemic-dominant items should be ranked “7,” “8,” and
“9.” The bad, but least bad, systemic-dominant negative items
should be ranked “10,” “11,” and “12;” the slightly worse
extrinsic-dominant items should be ranked “13,” “14,” and
“15;” and the decisively worse intrinsic-dominant disvalue items
should be ranked “16,” “17,” and “18.” Individuals will
actually rank these items from “best” to “worst” in an
incredibly diverse number of ways, but just how individual persons
rank them discloses their basic personality structures.
If you are curious about the nature of the value items on the
Profile, here they are for Part I, which deals with the self’s
evaluation of the world, and for Part II, which deals with the
self’s evaluation of itself. Here
people are asked to rank these eighteen items from “best” to
“worst.” A
baby Love
of nature A
mathematical genius “By
this ring I thee wed” A
devoted scientist A
good meal A
uniform An
assembly line A
technical improvement Nonsense A
fine A
short-circuit A
rubbish heap A
madman Slavery Burn
a witch at the stake Blow
up an airliner in flight Torture
a person Here
people are a
asked to rank these eighteen statements or quotes according to
the degree that they apply or do not apply to themselves. “I
love my work.” “I
love the beauty of the world.” “My
work brings out the best in me.” “I
feel at home in the world.” “I
like my work—it does me good.” “My
work adds to the beauty and harmony of the world.” “The
more I understand my place in the world, the better I get in my
work.” “The
universe is a remarkable harmonious system.” “The
world makes little sense to me.” “No
matter how hard I work, I shall always feel frustrated.” “My
work contributes nothing to the world.” “My
working conditions are poor, and ruin my work.” “The
lack of meaning in the Universe disturbs me.” “My
work makes me unhappy.” “My
life is messing up the world.” “I
hate my work.” “I
curse the day I was born.”
The Hartman Value Profile is copyrighted by
the Robert S. Hartman Institute for Formal and Applied Axiology. (See http://www.hartmaninstitute.org.) A very small royalty must be paid for each professional use, but the
wealth of information it yields about patients (and others who take
it) makes it well worth the price.[A7]
Currently it is used extensively in business consulting and
should be more widely used in psychotherapy[A8].
Scoring and interpreting the HVP are somewhat complicated, but these
are explained in its Manual of Interpretation (Hartman, 1973).
Scoring the HVP yields 57 interpretive score scales (Hartman, 1973, p.
1), some of which are much more revealing than others. What was once
done laboriously by hand can now be done almost instantaneously with
computers, and today most consultants and therapists who use the HVP
have developed their own scoring/interpreting software or have
affiliated with distributors who supply it to them. When properly
scored and interpreted the results can be extremely significant in
diagnosing a person’s strengths and weaknesses. It can pinpoint
serious problems in living, aid immensely in planning a therapeutic
regimen, and measure therapeutic progress with repeated applications
over time.
Of course, no therapist in her or his right mind would accept
such seemingly exorbitant claims
without considerable substantiation and evidence, but the required
work on that has been done. In July 2005, clinical psychologist Leon
Pomeroy published his work of a lifetime, The
New Science of Axiological Psychology [A9](Pomeroy,
2005). Pomeroy, now retired, spent most of his career as a clinical
psychologist at a
Pomeroy decisively demonstrates the
reliability and validity of the standard HVP; he devotes whole
chapters to analyzing and justifying it using Factor Analysis,
Construct Validity, Discriminant Validity, and Concurrent Validity
methodologies. Using Concurrent Validity methods, he correlates the
scales of the HVP with the scales of the “gold standard” MMPI
(Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory) and the Cattel CAQ
(Clinical Analysis Questionnaire), and he finds not merely minimal
statistical significance but truly amazing statistical correlations
between their scales and those of the HVP. To do this, of course, he
had to get his patients to take all three. He also finds significant
HVP scale correlations with those of the Cornel Medical Index (CMI)
and the Index of Autolethality (AL).[A10]
To make a very long story very short,[A11]
the scales of the HVP most directly measure a person’s overall value
sensitivity, including his or her abilities to distinguish between
different kinds of value, to have a sense of proportion about them, to
see and solve value problems, to distinguish between good and bad, and
to discern, differentiate between, and prioritize values in
individuals, in the world, and in systems (Hartman, 1973, pp. 1-2). In
turn, all of these value capacities can be and in fact are with good
evidence correlated with a vast array of personality and behavioral
traits. Hartman himself did it originally through his own profound
personal knowledge of and insight into human nature and individuals,
as expressed in both his theory of values in the Structure of Value
(Hartman, 1967) and in his Manual of Interpretation (Hartman,
1973). Pomeroy does it by drawing upon his years of clinical
experience as a professional psychologist and through employing the
above validation methodologies as developed and applied extensively in
his book.
You will just have to read the book to get
all the details[A12],
but one way to get a sense of how the scales of the HVP connect with
psychological and behavioral concepts of interest to psychotherapists
would be to scan the psychological/behavioral words in Pomeroy’s
“Index.” There we find detailed entries for such things as
affection, aggression, alcoholism, alienation, amorality, anger,
anti-self, anti-social, anxiety, atychal,
authority problems, balance, behavior(s), belief(s), bipolar, bizarre
behavior(s), boredom, brain disease, brooding, calm, clinical
insanity, compensation, compulsive, conformity, conscience,
consciousness, creativity, criminal, defenses, denial, dependency,
depression, diagnosis, dissociation, dissonance, distrust, dominance,
ego inflation, ego strength, emotion, empathy, extroversion, family
solidarity, fanaticism, fascism, fear, female,
fixation, fundamentalism, guilt, harmony, heterosexual
discomfort, hostility, hyperactivity, hypersensitivity,
hypochondriasis, hypomania, hysteria, identity, imbalance,
individualism, inferiority, insanity, intelligence, intimacy,
introversion, irrationality, irritability, know thyself, know thy
world, lassitude, left-brain, love, maladjustment, male, manic, mental
health, mental illness, mind, moral education, moral insanity, moral
psychology, moral science, moralistic, motivation, naivete,
negativity, neuroses, obsessive, optimism, organic symptoms,
outpatients, pain, paranoia, passivity, pathology, perfectionism,
personalities, pessimism, phobias, pleasure, prejudice, priorities,
problems in living, projective, pro-self, pro-social, psychoanalytic,
psychometrics, psychoses, psychosocial, psychosomatic, psychostasis,
psychotic, psychoticism, rationality, rational autonomy, rational
thinking, rationalization, religion, repression, right-brain, sanity,
schizophrenia, self value-vision, self-confidence, self-definitions,
self-destructive, self-esteem, self-identity, self-reliance,
self-valuation, sense of self, sensitivity, sexual, social, somatic,
splitting, stuttering, suffering, suicidal, superego, survival,
symptoms, tension, terrorism, thick skin, tough love, tough poise,
trauma, uniqueness, value-vision, violence, war, weakness, well being,
work, work-confidence, work-world, world value-vision, worry, and
worth—just to cover the high points!
The New Science of Axiological Psychology further
strengthens its case for the validity of the Hartman Value Profile
with highly original work done with collaborating physicians that
correlates its scales with biomedical factors like levels of
cholesterol, vitamin C, sodium, chloride, iron, lead, mercury, calcium
magnesium, potassium, etc., as measured in blood and hair samples (
In conclusion, if Pomeroy’s book gets the
attention it deserves, it should revolutionize psychology and
psychotherapy by refocusing them on human values and their genuine
measurability, by
reorienting these disciplines toward what and how we value as the real
keys to who and what we are. The Hartman Value Profile offers a
powerful and effective way to get to know patients (and others)
through their values. Try it; you’ll like it! As Robert S. Hartman
himself often said, “The proof of the pudding is in the eating!”[A14]
Hartman, R. S. (1967). The structure of value.
Hartman, R. S. (1973). The hartman value profile (HVP):
Manual of interpretation.
Martens, W. H. J. (2005). Shame and Narcissism: Therapeutic
Relevance of Conflicting Dimensions of Excessive Self Esteem, Pride,
and Pathological Vulnerable Self. Annals of the American
Psychotherapy Association, 8(2), 10-17.
Book Review #1: "The New Science of Axiological Psychology" by: Ronald Oltmanns, Applied Axiologist This book might naturally attract a rather narrow audience of
psychologists and academics. Let me share why I call this a sourcebook
for value science and why it should be read by people beyond the
apparently narrow intended audience. In the modern (or post-modern) world, we are used to thinking of
certain facts as irrefutable, backed up by the findings of science. We
even talk about the division between the "hard sciences"
(mathematics, chemistry, physics, etc.) and the "soft
sciences" or social sciences (psychology, sociology, history,
etc.). The areas of emotions, values, behaviors, morals are all
classified as "soft", difficult or impossible to measure,
and therefore not subject to the same kind of scientific scrutiny or
validation as the "hard sciences." We're back to the Middle
Ages in these fields; in sophisticated ways we're still battling over
theories and philosophies with no final standard to help us think and
act clearly about the subjects discussed. Hartman constructed an axiometric test called the Hartman Value
Profile (HVP) sometime between 1955-1965. It was expressive of his
theory of value science called Formal Axiology based on a formal
definition of the concept "good." Hartman answered the
question "What is good?" that had puzzled G.E. Moore; he
also elaborated a formal axiology that Edmund Husserl stated could be
extended from formal logic (see Robert S. Hartman, The Structure of
Value). MY CONCLUSION
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Book Review #2:
Critiquing a Modernist Approach to Values in Postmodern Times A review of Reviewed by Louis Hoffman The New Science of Axiological Psychology might have received much more positive attention had it been published 10 to 20 years ago. With its publication date of 2005, it runs the risk of being out of tune with the current zeitgeist in the field of psychology. Pomeroy’s desire is to create a science of morality and values (axiology), and he claims he has partially achieved such an ultimate truth. The arguments and research presented in his book failed to convince me that he has accomplished this.Psychology’s Postmodern Identity Crisis The field of psychology appears to be in a bit of an identity crisis in relation to where it stands philosophically. Many contemporary writings proclaim the arrival of postmodernism. At the heart of postmodernism is a challenge to the basic assumptions of modernistic science. However, as the claims of postmodernism increased in prevalence, psychology appeared to be moving in a more positivistic direction, as evidenced by the empirically validated treatment and empirically supported treatment movements. These highly modernistic movements began being challenged with the new language of evidence-based practice, which is more inclusive of multiple ways of knowing The New Science of Axiological Psychology by Leon Pomeroy New York: Rodopi, 2005. 360 pp. ISBN 9-042-01826-7. $100.00. It is ironic that 2005 may go down in history as playing a key role in moving clinical psychology into the postmodernist era. During his tenure as president of the American Psychological Association, Levant (2005) advocated a move toward evidence based practice in psychology. The way he defined evidence-based practice was much more inclusive of multiple ways of knowing and multiple methodologies. This shift from the previous understanding of empirically supported treatment signifies a strong move away from a modernist paradigm toward a postmodern philosophy of psychology and science. Pomeroy acknowledges that there are levels of morality, some of which are more absolute and some of which are more relativistic. This is largely consistent with Martin and Sugarman’s (1999) levels of reality. however, Pomeroy ignores the vital issue of the postmodern challenge and the limitations of his positivistic approach to psychological science. Given the current state of the fields of psychology and philosophy, this is a major oversight. Science and Rhetoric The tone of Pomeroy’s writing often comes across as inconsistent with the major themes of the book.Pomeroy states that the book is about a science of values, yet the tone is often that of rhetoric. If the book is scientifically based, then science should be allowed to speak for itself. Instead, the methodology of the book appears inconsistent with the scientific basis it claims. Pomeroy makes rather grandiose assertions of the importance of his findings and how this new science of axiology will impact psychology and the world at large, which remain unfulfilled at the end of the book. The animosity Pomeroy feels toward psychoanalysis is fairly explicit but seems misplaced. He writes as if psychoanalytic thinkers are currently a dominant, tyrannical authority in the field of psychology who prevent ideas such as his from being expressed. However, for several decades, cognitive psychology, the background from which Pomeroy writes, has held the privileged position in the field of psychology. This, along with several of my other critiques, may be partially accounted for by the length of time it took for Pomeroy to complete this project. Although I appreciate Pomeroy’s commitment to cognitive psychology, I do not find his harsh criticalness of other approaches to be beneficial to the field as a whole. The field of psychology, particularly in 2005, has made significant strides in being able to move beyond the petty competition among different theoretical orientations. As a professor, I have often found that one of the greatest challenges in getting students at the graduate level to understand and appreciate a particular theoretical perspective is getting them to let go of many of the distortions and stereotypes they were taught in their undergraduate career. These distortions often result from professors who do not adequately understand these theories or hold resentments against them. As graduate students begin to read the original works and understand the theories, many are amazed at the inaccuracies they have been taught. Given some of Pomeroy’s misuse of language from these other theories, I am left wondering whether some of his criticisms, which often are not very specific, are not based on inaccurate understanding of the theories. With the broad background that Pomeroy boasts, it becomes very difficult to master all the different realms of study. However, if we are to establish fruitful dialogue among the theories, it is important that critiques be well informed, or, at the very least, we should acknowledge the limitations of these critiques.The Limitations of Culture and Religion Pomeroy makes the claim several times that psychology, science, and society need to move beyond religious and cultural understandings of morals to a science of morality. He believes religion should look to this science of morality to determine religious morality. Although I agree that the field needs discussions beyond religious and cultural values, I disagree with Pomeroy’s approach and am concerned about the assertion that religion should base its values in science. In moving to discussions beyond religious and cultural values, it is necessary for various groups to be able to talk about differences and how to live with these differences. This is necessary to achieve greater peace in the world. I am concerned that Pomeroy’s approach could create an oppressive metanarrative that lacks sensitivity and understanding of certain cultural and religious practices. Second, the belief that religion should look to science for the establishment of values reflects a misunderstanding of the foundations of religious belief. This could be Interpreted as placing science above God, which many religious groups would find offensive. Philosophical Issues Although Pomeroy demonstrates his competence as a researcher in this volume, he makes several errors when addressing historical and philosophical issues. For example, he claims that “after the initial divorce of philosophy and psychology, the first instance of reconverging philosophical and psychological thought gave birth to clinically relevant cognitive psychology in the practice of Albert Ellis” (pp. 2-3). One could list numerous examples prior to Ellis, including Rank, Frankl, and May, among many others. Pomeroy references philosophy regularly throughout the book, so the neglect of many relevant philosophical issues is puzzling. Another very important ignored issue is the philosophy of science, which has received a good deal of attention in recent journals, including the American Psychologist (see Gergin, 2001; Rychlak, 2000). As he is with many issues, Pomeroy is very critical of the field of psychology, often stating that the field as a whole is in a problematic state of groupthink. However, the articles I have cited and many others reflect a diversity of positions on these critical issues. I share Pomeroy’s concern that powerful metanarratives in the field of psychology can be restricting of growth; however, I disagree with his appraisal of what those metanarratives are. Another concern with many of Pomeroy’s critiques of psychology pertains to their vagueness. He provides little evidence for what he is critiquing, which greatly limits the dialectical process. The dialectical process, as developed through the journals and other professional publications, plays an important role in the betterment of the field. Psychology grows through the process of critique and considered responses. However, critiques are not very beneficial if they are not clear or are based on a false reality. For many of Pomeroy’s critiques, I question the existence of what he is critiquing in the manner he states. For others, I am not sure what he is critiquing. As Pomeroy continues to develop his ideas, which I hope he does, it would be beneficial for him to review in more detail what he is critiquing and then clarify the specific concerns.Is Axiology New to Psychology? Pomeroy purports that the in-depth analysis of morals and values that Hartman and he advocate is a rather new idea in the field of psychology. However, I challenge the validity of this position. If Pomeroy is stating this in terms of a narrowly defined positivistic approach to science, I agree that he is likely correct. However, the examination of values, including scientific examination, has long been part of the many branches of psychology (Oskamp, 1991). In the process of debate, the person who is able to successfully define the terms always has an advantage. As far as the reader accepts Pomeroy’s definitions, particularly his definitions of axiology, beliefs, and values, his position appears valid. However, where I disagree most with Pomeroy is in his definitions and interpretations. Alan Bergin (1980a) dedicated much of his career to the study of values in the context of psychotherapy. This includes the famous Bergin-Ellis debate in the Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology (Bergin 1980a, 1980b; Ellis, 1980). Many other psychologists, particularly humanistic and existential psychologists, have taken in-depth consideration of values apart from religion very seriously. It would be more accurate for Pomeroy to ascertain that no one has approached values in the same manner as himself and Hartman.Research Strengths The value of this book is more in the research than in the theoretical writing, which takes the greater portion of the book. Unfortunately, I think Pomeroy will lose the majority of his potential audience in the introduction and the first two chapters of the book, which will prevent most people from getting to the research. If I had not agreed to review this book, I would not have continued past the introduction, for several reasons. First, the rhetorical style of writing led me to question Pomeroy’s ability to approach the research with appropriate containment of his bias. Second, Pomeroy’s understanding of philosophy and the history of psychology appears skewed. Some of this appears to be biased toward placing his mentor, Ellis, more centrally. Third, I found the disparaging remarks toward other approaches to psychology and psychotherapy to be inaccurate and distasteful. Despite these many limitations, the research question is an important one, and this research is an important contribution. I think it would behoove Pomeroy to make this research available through other sources, as I would have a difficult time recommending to the psychological community a book this expensive with this many limitations. However, now let me focus on some of the strengths of the book. A good majority of the book, beginning in Chapter 3, is written in a manner similar to many test manuals, including the initial statistical data on the Hartman Value Profile (HVP). The reported statistics are quite impressive, particularly in their concurrent validity with other measures. The primary measures used for concurrent validity are the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, the 16 Personality Factors, and the Clinical Analysis Questionnaire. Because Pomeroy often chooses to report the levels of significance, which are quite high, instead of the correlation scores, the one question that arises pertains to discriminant validity. Pomeroy’s research is also impressive in the inclusion of several cross-cultural samples, including the number of different cultures considered. The samples include Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Russia, and the United States. This provides good initial cross-cultural data on the HVP. I agree that this gives ample initial support for the cross-cultural utility of this measure, but I am much more hesitant with Pomeroy’s claim that this is evidence for universal morals or values. Utility of the HVP My initial impression is that the HVP has great promise as a resource for cognitive therapists, but I am more skeptical about how practical it is for therapists from some other backgrounds. This is not a weakness of the HVP but rather an acknowledgment of the differences that exist in the field. Pomeroy’s hope seems to be that this book, the HVP, and axiological psychology as he understands it will revolutionize psychology. I am not convinced. Rather, I believe this tool could be a very useful clinical resource for a certain niche of psychologist. The interpretation of HVP is complicated and may require training. Pomeroy mentions that training workshops are available for people interested in learning how to use the HVP to its greatest potential. One of the strengths of the measure itself is its brevity. It takes about 15 min to complete the inventory. Although the interpretation may be more detailed than many measures with a similar administration time, the overall time to complete an administration and interpretation is one of the strengths of this measure. Lingering Questions At the end of this book, I am left with many unanswered questions. How does Pomeroy account for the implicit dualistic tendencies in his theory? He speaks to the distinctness of mind and body, suggesting physics as an insufficient model compared with moral science, but does not address the nature of this dualism. He states that Hartman’s theory is religiously neutral while advocating for a specific metaphysical reality of the mind and a universal morality. I am left unclear as to the nature of this reality to which Pomeroy speaks. Pomeroy explicitly critiques reductionism, but his theory, methodology, and research appear highly reductionistic. As postmodernism has highlighted, language is socially constructed and often used differently by different individuals and different fields. However, I am familiar with many views on reductionism, and this still appears contradictory to me. I would appreciate clarification from Pomeroy on how he uses the term reductionism and how he feels his approach is not reductionistic. Frequently, I became aware that Pomeroy’s usage of beliefs and values is different than my own. However, I do not feel that he defines these terms with adequate clarity. I would appreciate additional clarification on how Pomeroy defines these and other terms.Conclusion In ways, I feel my own review of The New Science of Axiological Psychology is not fair. I approach the field of psychology from a different theoretical model, hold to a different epistemological foundation, and do not share many of Pomeroy's values, particularly in professional realms. I hope other reviews of this book will offer different perspectives about the potential value of this book. However, I feel this review and these critiques are important. I am deeply concerned about the tendency toward universalizing this theory that is consistently suggested in this book. I am bothered by the preemptive criticism of those, such as myself, who would critique this book. Yet I think it is evident that these critiques are not due to allegiance to what Pomeroy sees as the groupthink of psychology. I also remain hopeful that Pomeroy's future research and writing may address many of these concerns and take seriously the questions that emerge in response to this book. My greatest concerns remain in the rhetoric, the ill-defined terms, and the interpretations of the research. It is evident that there are a good many very useful research data and results in what Pomeroy has compiled. It would be a great loss to the psychological community if the utility of this information were lost because of the chosen method of presenting the materials. Edwards's editorial foreword begins the book by stating that this is not an easy book to read. I agree, but for different reasons. The content is not overly difficult; rather, the style of writing, the frequent grandiose claims, and the rhetoric left me often not wanting to return to reading the book. References Bergin, A. E. (1980a). Psychotherapy and religious values. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 48, 75-105.Bergin, A. E. (1980b). Religious and humanistic values: A reply to Ellis and Walls. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 48, 642-645.Ellis, A. (1980). Psychotherapy and atheistic values: A response to A. E. Bergin's “Psychotherapy and religious values.” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 48, 635-639.Gergen, K. J. (2001). Psychological science in a postmodern context. American Psychologist, 56, 803-813.Levant, R. F. (2005). Evidence-based practice in psychology [Electronic version]. Monitor on Psychology, 36(2) Retrieved January 3, 2005, from http://www.apa.org/monitor/feb05/pc.htmlMartin, J., & Sugarman, J. (1999). Psychology's reality debate: A “levels of reality” approach. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 19, 177-194.Oskamp, S. (1991). Attitudes and opinions (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.Rychlak, J. F. (2000). A psychotherapist's lessons from the philosophy of science. American Psychologist, 55, 1126-1132.PsycCRITIQUES - Critiquing a Modernist Approach to Values in Postmodern Times http://online.psycinfo.com/psyccritiques/display/?artid=2005258112 3/16/2006
A Tour of Historical Horizons Socrates (470-399 B.C.) Socrates is the greatest philosopher that ever lived. He served with courage and distinction in the Athenian army during the Peloponnesian Wars between Athens and Sparta. He and much later Galileo gave us natural science in the West. His primary interest was ethics and morality which he regarded as the most important topics in all of philosophy and psychology. He believed the highest virtue is self knowledge, in the sense of knowing one's human nature, and that the virtues of moral wisdom and knowledge prevent evil. prevented evil. Socrates is the world's first moral psychologist concerned with values foreshadowing today's axiological science and axiological psychology introduced at this web site! Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) Herbart is the philosopher who succeeded Immanuel Kant as professor of philosophy, mathematics, and psychology at Konigsberg University. He believed that moral education should be the focus of all education; a view that foreshadows axiological psychology made possible by Dr. Pomeroy's systematic transformation of a mathematical model of value and moral phenomena into a science of values and morals in the 21st century! Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936) Ivan Pavlov in 1928 summed up his faith in his “Lectures on Conditioned Reflexes” as follows: •“Only science, exact science about human nature, and the most sincere approach to it employing the scientific method, will deliver man from his gloom and purge him from his contemporary shame!” Unknown to Ivan Pavlov, this would take the discovery of a second science (Axiological Science) to fulfill his vision of the future! E. L. Thorndike (1874-1949) Some refer to the American psychologist E. L. Thorndike as the "Sane Positivist" because he believed that a science of values (non existent in his day) would one day guide moral reasoning and improve our lives. (See: "Laws of Learning to a Science of Values: Efficiency and Morality." In: "Thorndike's Educational Psychology," American Psychologist, 53: 1145-1152, 1998) Miguel de Unamuno (1864-1936) The Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno was born in the Basque region of Spain. He is the author of "The Tragic Sense of Life" where he writes critically of the failure of natural science to successfully address the human condition. Unamuno was grounded in historic Mono-Polar Science (Natural, Material or Mechanistic Science) but was frustrated over its failure to significantly contribute to our understand human nature. His concerns make him one of the founders of humanistic psychology, on which Axiological Psychology builds. Unamuno sought a science of "flesh and blood" responding to human beings as moral agents defined by their values. It disturbed Miguel de Unamuno to witness half-smart humanity as a leaky boat on a rough sea. We suspect he would have approved the reconstruction of the social sciences around a science of values and morals! Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) The "Danish Socrates" Soren Kierkegaard is one of the founders of existentialism which influenced the development of humanistic psychology, clinically relevant cognitive psychology and finally axiological psychology. Kierkegaard identifies three levels of existence: 1. the aesthetic level; 2. the ethical level, and 3. the religious level. At any moment in time one dominates over the others, but all three influence our lives. He believed understanding these levels of being would help us discover human nature in the sense of "know thyself." 1. The aesthetic level is the hedonistic level of existence and implies either sensual or intellectualist life styles where the aesthetic-sensualist loves love, bit is incapable of love! The aesthetic- intellectualist loves abstractions and thinking but in time becomes unhappy with abstractions and ideas. Both end up bored, lusting after diversions and stimulations only to end up in a world of emptiness and despair. 2. The ethical level of existence involves sensitivity to the individuality and uniqueness of others. In axiological psychology this is the Intrinsic (I) level of valuation. At this level of existence one may end up with an ironic awareness of the moral complexities and ambiguities of life realizing that the goal of complete justice is impossible. 3. The religious level of existence involves the surrender to God and faith resulting in a conflict between faith and reason in an imperfect world. In axiological psychology this is a Systemic (S) variation of the Intrinsic (I) level of existence. At this level one struggles to resolve the demands of faith and reason. Kierkegaard's philosophy attempts to deal with "flesh and blood" issues rather than merely engaging in philosophical abstractions concerning nature and human nature. He concludes, like the boxer in the ring, one who makes successful moves towards, away and against his opponent, and is not stuck anywhere implying we exist on all these levels of existence without becoming stuck anywhere. In axiological psychology we have the Intrinsic (I), Extrinsic (E), and Systemic (S) levels of existence given by a mathematical model of cognitive processing dedicated to valuation and thinking. Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) In his existential writing about being in the world (Dasein), Martin Heidegger agonized over the fact that human beings are so concerned with the toys of natural science (the extrinsic world in the language of axiological science and psychology) that they fail to deal deeply with what is most important of all/; our being in the world (our intrinsic existence in the language of axiological science and psychology). What is to be become of being and becoming (dynamisms of intrinsic existence interacting with extrinsic and systemic existence in the language of axiological psychology) as we face death? Axiological science and psychology were unavailable to Heidegger as he struggled with being and becoming. These days it may be said being and becoming are grounded in science for the first time in history! It may be said in axiological psychology we now have a science of existentialism! Franz Brentano (1838-1917) Franz Brentano took a Ph.D. in philosophy, then prepared for the priesthood, and then was ordained in 1864 only to break with the Catholic church. He served as professor of philosophy at the University of Vienna for twenty years (1874-1894) during which time Sigmund Freud and Edmund Husserl were his students. Brentano is a significant historic force in the founding of humanistic and phenomenological psychology and his work influenced the American William James's functional psychology, the Austrian Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic psychology, the German Max Wertheimer's Gestalt psychology, the German Husserl's phenomenological psychology, and the American Abraham Maslow's humanist psychology. Brentano recognized the importance of a purposive psychology (as did philosopher Leibnitz before him and psychologists William McDougall and Edward Tolman after him). His student Sigmund Freud failed to sufficiently recognize human beings as moral agents grounded in values which so define the human condition; a point of view that "The New Science of Axiological Psychology" (Rodopi Press, 2005) corrects following decades of psychoanalytic destruction of the moral fabric of societies and civilizations; made worse by run-away natural science and technology without moral science checks and balances discussed elsewhere! Gordon Allport (1897-1967) Gordon Allport's book "Becoming" elegantly distinguishes between Leibnizian and Lockean traditions in psychology. The Leibnizian tradition emphasizes proactive, purposive, goal-directed, self-actualizing, volitional, and integrative behavior that defines human nature! The Lockean tradition emphasizes reactive, mechanistic, behavioristic, approaches to behavior that so defines nature. With the emergence of axiological psychology (based on the intellectual traditions of Leibnizian purposive monadology, McDougall's purposive behaviorism, Tolman's purposive neobehaviorism, Existentialism, Phenomenology, Gestalt psychology, humanistic psychology, and cognitive psychology) we achieve an empirical science of that which most defines human-nature, as distinguished from nature!
Carl Rogers (1902-1987) Carl Rogers studied under Alfred Adler from 1927 to 1928. He then broke with Adler and developed Client-Centered Psychotherapy that demystified psychotherapy and put the priesthood of psychoanalysis in its place before cognitive psychology came along and finished the job! Psychoanalysis was based on the medical model and in spite of Freud's half-smart rebellion against this paradigm psychoanalysis never fell far from the tree of medicine and physiology with its trade mark preoccupation with sickness care, and the imperative of diagnosis before treatment. Carl Rogers objected to the negative impact of diagnostic labeling in the field of garden variety problems in living! He proceeded directly with psychotherapy and the business of listening to and experiencing his clients in a phenomenological sense. He was interested in how they valued "self" and "others," for he believed that the "self" is constantly engaged in valuations where habitual evaluative thoughts become organized around the cognitive constructions of actual-self and ideal-self. The gap between actual-self and ideal-self (degree of congruence) produced tensions leading to problems in living when poorly handled. Rogers believed the valuing process is of psychosocial and biosocial origins. In agreement with his mentor Alfred Adler, Rogerian Psychotherapy was more optimistic than the pessimism of psychoanalysis> Like Adler and Maslow, Rogers believed that there is a drive towards self-actualization involving values, choice, meaning, purpose and goals all of which placed values at the center of psychology and psychotherapy. One wonders why it has taken so long for the profession of psychology to wake up to the importance of developing a basic and applied science of values and morals of the sort that finally unfolds in the pages of "The New Science of Axiological Psychology" published in 2005? Viktor Frankl (1905-1997) Viktor Frankl took his M.D. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Vienna where he also served as professor of neurology and psychiatry. His most important mentor was Alfred Adler and like Carl Rogers Frankl breaks with Adler and to found his own school of psychotherapy known as Logotherapy. In the VIenna of his day Logotherapy was also referred to as The Third Viennese School of Psychotherapy." He had a successful practice until Hitler and the Nazi party imprisoned him in a series of four concentration camps following his failure to leave Vienna as Freud had done. Frankl is best known for his book "Man's Search for Meaning" (1985). Following WWII he lectured at Harvard and Stanford, then served as Professor of Logotherapy at the U. S. International University of San Diego. Frankl lost his father, mother, brother, and wife in the concentration camps between 1942 and 1945. Rogers and others wondered how Frankl could go on living? His answer had to do with his notion of what is ultimately important in life which is the finding of purposeful and meaningful work and activities which of course is all about personal values and moral agency! As a physician and neurologist Frankl recognized the importance of brain studies but warned against the fallacy of a twisted molecule for every twisted thought. His work elevates the importance of values and morals in our lives and foreshadows Dr. Pomeroy's work in the fields of axiological science and axiological psychology! Joseph F. Rychlak (1928- ) Clinical psychologist Joseph Rychlak argues that a science of humanistic psychology, based on natural science, is possible and that there is no need for psychologists to question the paradigm of natural science. He argues that what is needed are new natural science assumptions concerning human behavior in order to deal with what he calls telosponsivity in the context free will. Rychlak's telosponsivity points to a purposive humanistic psychology in the tradition of philosopher Leibniz and psychologists McDougall and Tolman and rightly focuses on the purposive dimension of human nature while concluding that natural science will permit us to study purposive behavior because today's natural science has evolved beyond Newtonian mechanics into the world of probabilistic quantum physics. Dr. Pomeroy rejects this naive view of psychological epistemology (Grounded in Mono-Polar Science) and delivers in the pages of his recently published book the Multi-Polar Science needed for the study and appreciation of human beings as moral agents grounded in the phenomenology of values and valuations! James Mark Baldwin (1861-1934) James Baldwin worked in the field of psychology and significantly influenced the work of Jean Piaget, a pioneer of cognitive psychology. Baldwin is remembered for his three stage theory of cognitive evolution which he identified as prelogical, logical, and hyperlogical stages paralleling the evolution of habitual evaluative habits leading to the clustering of such habits around three central tendencies known as Intrinsic (I), Extrinsic (E), and Systemic (S) dimensions of valuation in the field of axiological psychology. These cognitive axes, lenses, or dimensions dedicated to valuation are identified by Hartman's Mathematical Model of value and moral phenomena more recently validated in the pages of "The New Science of Axiological Psychology" (Rodopi Press, 2005). This conditioning and parlaying of protoplasmic irritability into pre-linguistic then linguistic descriptive and evaluative cognitive processes is something Piaget and, more recently, axiological psychology focuses on. The protovaluational stage of valuation corresponds to Baldwin's pre-logical stage of cognitive evolution dedicated to valuation. The subsequent acquisition of language mediates the development of more complex and richer valuations giving rise to I, E, and S axes of valuation in turn mediating the development of I, E and S beliefs and belief systems. Baldwin's logical stage of cognitive evolution corresponds to Pomeroy's stage of macrovaluation which evolves into an valuational cascade of value abstraction leading to mesovaluation (belief systems) and then microvaluation (focused means (instrumental) and ends (terminal) attitudes) characterized by purposive, meaningful, goal oriented behavior! George A. Miller (1920 - ) Axiological Psychology has roots in the fields of philosophy and psychology. In the field of psychology it evolves as a variant of the emerging paradigm of cognitive psychology which George A. Miller and others began to view more favorably when Miller's verbal learning data forced him to do so! The house historians of psychology report that Miller believes the birth of cognitive psychology dates from the Symposium on Information Theory, sponsored by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 11, 1956, at which Allen Newell and Herbert Simon reported on computer logic; Noam Chomsky reported on transformational grammar, and George Miller reported on the channel capacity of short-term memory being about seven units. Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin in the 1950s also contributed to the development of experimental cognitive psychology. Clinically relevant cognitive psychology dates from the work of clinician Albert Ellis, Ph.D. in New York. In 1967 Ulric Neisser published "Cognitive Psychology" which was an early attempt to summarize cognitive research. Beyond these proximal origins of cognitive psychology we have more distal origins in the work of Tolman's purposive neobehaviorism, McDougall's purposive behaviorism, Leibniz's purposive philosophy, Gestalt psychology, existential psychology, phenomenological psychology, and humanistic psychology, all currents in the stream of historical psychology, have contributed to the development of axiological psychology. It remains for history to judge whether axiological psychology qualifies as revolutionary new paradigm in the field of psychology, born of philosophy and cognitive psychology. In the meantime axiological science promises to enrich basic cognitive science and applied cognitive psychology, even as it launches a reconstruction of psychology around values and morals (axiological psychology), in the 21st century. Copyright © 2000-2008 Behavioral Axiology™ Last Updated: 05/31/09
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